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LEGAL FORMALISM FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF A REASONABLE
LAW PROFESSOR
JEAN C. LOVE*

In January of 1992, I was asked to comment on Professor
Weinrib's paper, entitled "The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism," at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools. Because I am not trained in philosophy, I agreed
to speak from the perspective of the "ordinary torts professor."
When I received Professor Weinrib's manuscript, it arrived
under cover of the following letter:
Here is the text of the paper for the AALS session.... What
I have tried to do is reduce the formalist position to its main
elements through the contrast of the formal with the substantive. I have tried to pitch the presentation to the reasonable law professor, who mows the lawn in short sleeves, who
rides the Clapham omnibus, and who is not excessively
con1
cerned with the matters we are going to discuss.
In this piece, I will speak for those of us who "mow the lawn in
our short sleeves"-women and men alike.
The first observation that I want to make is that Professor
Weinrib may have overestimated the ability of the reasonable
law professor to comprehend abstract philosophical terms. In
an Afterword to the University of Southern California Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal
Thought, I commented that pragmatism offers "both the hope
of a constructive way of thinking about society's problems and
the hope of a common language." 2 Those are not the first
words that come to my mind as I attempt to sum up the value
of formalism. Formalism, unlike pragmatism, operates at a level
of abstraction that requires the use of words and phrases that
are not part of the working vocabulary of the ordinary law
professor.
Having identified a major vice of formalism, let me now focus
on some of its virtues. Professor Weinrib's "voice from the
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa Law School.
1. Letter from Professor Ernest Weinrib to ProfessorJean Love (Dec. 2, 1991)(on
file with author).
2. Jean C. Love, Renaissance of Pragmatism in Amelican Legal Thought: Afierword, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1911, 1925 (1990).
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empty sepulchre" 3 resonates with ancient wisdom. It speaks to
us of forms of justice. It talks about correlative rights and duties. It echoes in the air with words like freedom, equality, and
human dignity-words that the reasonable man and woman
have always understood, regardless of race, color, culture,
creed, class, age or sexual orientation. Formalism, then, takes
us back to our roots. It asks us to think about the basic structures of our legal system. It reminds us that if we want to reform the substantive law, we must do so in a way that is
consistent with the basic forms ofjustice.4
Formalism, as defined by Professor Weinrib, also entails a
way of looking at law. In order to understand legal relationships, we must examine legal institutions and practices from an
internal standpoint, using the skills acquired in law school,
rather than examining them from an external standpoint, using
the skills that might be acquired in other graduate school disciplines.5 Because we, the reasonable law professors who mow
the lawn and ride the bus, usually have only one advanced degree-a J.D.-we should embrace Professor Weinrib's theory
of formalism if for no other reason than that it validates our
own intellectual endeavors!
On a more serious note, I will now examine the strengths
and limitations of Professor Weinrib's legal formalism as applied to tort law and tort reform. I have chosen to focus on tort
law both because Professor Weinrib uses it to illustrate his theory' and because it is a topic that I have taught for the past
twenty years.
Let me begin by summarizing Professor Weinrib's formalism, as I understand it.7 Legal formalism identifies two basic
3. ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Jurisprudenceof Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY
583, 583 (1993).
4. See id. at 587-89.
5. See id. at 592.
6. See id. at 584.
7. See id.; see also ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (forthcoming 1993)(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Weinrib's theory of formalism is further
explained in the following articles: ErnestJ. Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms ofjustice, 2 RATIO
JURIs 211 (1989); ErnestJ. Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, 77 IowA L. REV. 403 (1992); ErnestJ. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1987); ErnestJ.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988);
ErnestJ. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1283 (1989);
ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL LJ. 403 (1989); ErnestJ.
Weinrib, UnderstandingTort Law, 23 VAL. L. REV. 485 (1989). In subsequent footnotes, I
will make repeated references to the published articles, but I will not continue to cite to
the unpublished manuscript.
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forms ofjustice: corrective justice and distributive justice. Corrective justice is the form underlying private law; distributive
justice is the form underlying public law. Professor Weinrib is
interested in developing a theory of private law that concentrates on liability, rather than on property: a theory that will
distinguish private law from public law. To that end, he defines
private law institutionally as a bilateral process of adjudication
that retroactively affirms the rights and duties of the parties by
first determining liability and then awarding appropriate remedies. Conceptually, he describes private law as a regime of correlative rights and duties designed to protect the bodily
integrity of individual human beings as well as the property
that they happen to hold. Public law, by contrast, is a multilateral process of redistributing property in accord with some collectively determined criterion, such as merit or need. Fields of
law that are clearly encompassed by Professor Weinrib's definition of private law include torts, contracts, and restitution.
Fields of law that clearly fall within the domain of public law
include taxation and social welfare legislation.
How does Professor Weinrib's formalism help us to resolve
the controversies that are raging within the field of tort law in
the 1990s? First of all, his formalism instructs us to evaluate
tort law by focusing on its form, not its goals. We must understand that the purpose of tort law is to correct injustice, not to
compensate or to deter.8 Many observers criticize tort law from
a multitude of viewpoints, often advocating its abolition. If we
evaluate tort law, however, from the standpoint of formalism,
rather than functionalism, we may find fewer flaws and be less
inclined to abolish it.'
In addition to telling us to focus on form rather than substance, Professor Weinrib's formalism tells us that if we view
tort law through the lens of corrective justice, we will see that
tort liability must be based on fault. 10 Why? Not because of the
bilateral structure of corrective justice per se, but because there
is an underlying concept of free and equal agency that is implicit in the bilateral structure of corrective justice. Drawing on
Kant"s and Hegel 2 to flesh out the concept of free and equal
8. See Weinrib, supra note 3, at 586.
9. For a discussion of recent trends in tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning
and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601 (1992).
10. See Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, supra note 7, at 1297-1308.
11. See Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, supra note 7, at 72.
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agency, Professor Weinrib concludes that "freedom" entails
the ability to choose and that "human equality" gives rise to an
obligation to choose to live one's life in a manner that does not
interfere with another human being's equality. Whenever two
human beings interact, they have a mutual obligation to respect
each other's equality. Put another way, they have a mutual right
to be treated as equals in both their personhood and their capacity to hold property. A violation of the right to be treated as
an equal is a wrong which gives rise to liability based on fault.
We describe it as liability based on fault because it requires
proof of an intention to run the risk of interfering with another
human being's equality."3
The third insight we gain from Professor Weinrib's formal12. See Weinib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, supra note 7, at 1283.
13. See Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice,supra note 7, at 419-24.

Professor Weinrib does not distinguish between intentional torts and unintentional
torts in his description of "liability based on fault." He describes all fault-based tortious conduct as conduct by an actor who intends to run the risk of interfering with
another human being's equality. Other commentators who argue that principles of corrective justice require the imposition of tort liability based on fault, such as Professor
David Owen, distinguish between intentional "takings" and accidental injuries:
[T]he moral character of a person's choice to act in a manner causing harm to
another person is dependent upon whether the actor accorded equal concern
and respect to the other's interest at the time of choice and action. Such respect requires, first, that actors properly regard the vested "property" (and
other established) rights of other persons, just as actors would want others to
respect their own possession of such rights. Both the law of crimes and torts
thus protect persons against the theft of a book and against an unprovoked
punch in the nose....
Accidents, however, ordinarily cannot be viewed usefully as "takings" of
such established "rights," demanding compensation. The general application
of this form of "taking" perspective to every accident would amount to a rule
of strict liability, which is unacceptable ....
Instead, when an actor's choice of action involves only a risk of harm to
others, necessary and incidental to the pursuit of some proper goal not harmful in itself, then the moral character of the action depends on an evaluation of
the relative worth of the affected interests-principally of the actor and the victim,
but also of other persons. If an act is likely to achieve a good for the actor and
others that is greater than any harm foreseeably risked to the victim and
others, then it is morally justifiable in terms of equality, and vice versa....
[Ihf aggregate interest balancing of this type were used as the primaly definition of liability for accidental harm, it could be faulted for denying value to
important individual rights of the parties to an accident. For this reason, riskbenefit analysis generally should be resorted to only as a "default rule," for
use when a freedom and vested rights analysis fails to provide an adequate
resolution of a dispute. Even in such a default role, however, risk-utility principles are valuable tools for determining responsibility. Principles of freedom
and vested rights alone frequently are unable to resolve the complex questions of accountability .

. . ,

and risk-benefit analysis often provides the most

helpful guide for determining moral and legal responsibility for accidental
harm.
David G. Owen, The Fault?, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 720-23 (1992).
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ism is that the two forms of justice 4 -corrective justice and
distributive justice-are "categorically different and mutually
irreducible." 1 5 Because of this dichotomy, a single legal relationship "cannot coherently partake of both."' 6 Consequently,
Professor Weinrib cautions tort reformers that they must either
modify tort law to accord with the form of corrective justice or
replace it with an accident compensation plan that conforms to
the structure of distributive justice. As a formalist, he has no
stake in establishing the superiority of tort law over other
mechanisms for handling injuries inflicted by human beings
upon each other. 7 He does, however, have a stake in policing
the purity of the form of whatever alternative to tort law is
chosen. 18
Let me now question these three admonitions to torts scholars spoken from the empty sepulchre of legal formalism. First,
do I think that it is appropriate to describe the purpose of tort
law as "correcting injustice," rather than achieving compensation, deterrence, or some other functional goal? Is formalism
superior to functionalism in helping us to understand the
essence of tort law? I think that it is. Formalism captures the
bilateral nature of tort litigation in a single snapshot. Functionalism takes two separate photos: one of the plaintiff, who is receiving compensatory damages or some form of specific relief;
the other of the defendant, whose tortious activity is being deterred by the imposition of a judgment either for damages or
for some form of specific relief. From a functionalist's perspective, tort law tries to accomplish too many objectives simultaneously and attains none of them completely. From a formalist's
just what it is supposed
perspective, however, tort law is doing
20
to be doing-correcting injustices.
Let me provide a concrete example from the field of constitutional tort law. In the 1970s and 1980s, many constitutional
tort scholars, myself included, were urging the United States
Supreme Court to award damages for the "inherent value of
the plaintiff's constitutional right" on the theory that such an
14. For a discussion of Aristotle's two forms ofjustice, see id. at 404-09.
15. Weinrib, supra note 3, at 588.
16. Id. at 589.
17. See id. at 587.
18. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, supra note 7, at
985; see also Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, supra note 7, at 492.
19. See Weinrib, supra note 3, at 586.
20. See Weinrib, UnderstandingTort Law, supra note 7, at 510-15.
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award of damages unquestionably would be sufficiently large to
deter violations of the United States Constitution. 2 ' Justice
Powell, writing for the Court in both Carey v. Piphus 22 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura23, rejected the concept
of awarding compensatory damages for the "inherent value of
the plaintiff's constitutional right."' 24 Instead, he insisted upon
limiting the amount of the compensatory damage award to the
value of the "particular injury" caused to the particular plaintiff
by the deprivation of the constitutional right.25 He explained
the Court's decision by saying that he could find no evidence of
Congressional intent to "establish a deterrent more formidable
' 26
than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages."
Professor Weinrib's formalism tells us thatJustice Powell's reasoning was correct. Because Congress chose to create a constitutional tort action under § 198327 pursuant to the form of
corrective justice, any remedy for a violation of § 1983 must
2
conform with the basic structure of corrective justice. 1
The second issue that I want to consider is whether corrective justice requires that tort liability be based on fault. This is a
critical question because some torts scholars, such as Richard
Epstein, have argued that corrective justice mandates the imposition of strict tort liability, 29 whereas other torts scholars, including Professor Weinrib, have contended that corrective
justice mandates the imposition of fault-based liability. 30 My
own opinion is that corrective justice, as aform ofjustice, is not
capable of speaking definitively to the issue of substantive tort
liability." Corrective justice, as a form ofjustice, may place cer21. A summary of my argument is presented in Jean C. Love, Presumed General Com.
pensatory Damages in ConstitutionalTort Litigation: A CorrectiveJusticePerspective, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 67, 71-73 (1992).
22. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
23. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
24. Love, supra note 21, at 71-79.
25. See id. at 79-90.
26. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
28. See Love, supra note 21, at 67-68, 79-80.
29. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3J. LEG. SmUD. 165 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CANADIANJ.
LAW &JURIs. 147 (1988); see also Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, supra note
7, at 1297-1308.
31. Professor Weinrib, in his discussion of Aristotle, acknowledges that Aristotelian
corrective justice describes the form, but not the content, of tort law (and of private
law):
Aristotle's description of corrective justice is... devoid of specifics. None of
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tain constraints or outer limits on the contours of substantive
private law, but I do not think that it is capable of mandating
the adoption of one tort liability regime over another. Rather,
corrective justice, as aform ofjustice, accommodates a wide variety of liability regimes, including liability for restitution, liability for breach of contract, and liability for tortious conduct.
Some scholars, including Richard Posner3 2 and Richard
Wright,"3 have returned to Aristotle's original text 4 in an efthe issues that preoccupy modem scholars of private law-the standard of liability in tort law, the measure of damages in contract law, and the definition of
causation, for example-receives any attention. Instead, Aristotle presses the
obvious point that a defendant who has taken something from a plaintiff has a
comparative excess of twice the amount taken, so that the initial equilibrium is
restored when the defendant returns the amount taken to the plaintiff.
Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, supra note 7, at 412.
Professor Weinrib concludes that corrective justice mandates fault-based liability by
connecting the concept of "equality" (which is implicit in the Aristotelian form of corrective justice) with the concept of agency (which is at the core of the natural right
theories developed by Kant and Hegel). See id. at 421-24.
Professor Weinrib's response may have weakened his argument that the natural right
theory of agency mandates fault-based liability. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Formalism and
PracticalReason, or How to Avoid Seeing Ghosts in the Empty Sepulchre, 16 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 683 (1993). In proving that both corrective justice and distributive justice are
informed by the natural right theory of agency, Professor Weinrib adopts a contextual
approach to the meaning of "agency." Id. "Agency" and "practical reason" operate
differently within different contexts, according to Weinrib, because "our moral life expresses itself through a variety of shapes" of experience. Id. at 684. Agency and practical reason are highly abstracted concepts within the sphere of corrective justice,
symbolized by a "free and purposive" agent who does not act in a manner "inconsistent with the free purposiveness of other agents." Id. at 686. Such a highly abstracted
conception ofagency gives rise to "negative duties" only. Id. at 687. By contrast, within
the sphere of distributive justice, agency and practical reason are more particularized
concepts, symbolized by a "free and equal" agent who acts with the "moral capacity" to
create a "fair system of social cooperation" so that "primary goods" will be distributed
in some way that promotes "some notion of good." Id. at 689-90. This more particularized conception of agency and natural reason creates "positive duties" as well as
negative duties. ll at 690.
It seems to me that Weinrib's highly abstracted concept of "agency" within the
sphere of corrective justice is as compatible with strict tort liability for abnormally dangerous activities as it is with fault-based liability for intentionally, recklessly, or negligently inflicted harm. Both classes of cases require proof of conduct by a "free and
purposive" agent that is "inconsistent with the free purposiveness of other agents."
Both types of tort action fit within Weinrib's description of corrective justice:
Corrective justice is the sphere of practical reason that establishes norms for
agents solely on the basis of their purposiveness without considering the desirability of their particular purposes. All that corrective justice requires is that
one not do wrong to the rights that are personal, proprietary, and contractual
embodiments of another agent's purposiveness.
Id. at 693.
32. See Richard A. Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories of Tort Law,
10J. LEG. STUD. 187, 189-91 (1981).
33. See Richard W. Wright, Substantive CorrectiveJustice,77 IowA L. REv. 625, 691-702
(1992).
34. A translation of the original text appears infra at text accompanying note 38.

HeinOnline -- 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 633 1993

634

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 16

fort to resolve the question of whether corrective justice requires liability based on fault. I have followed in their
footsteps, only to lose my way in the thicket of conflicting
translations of ancient Greek to modem English. 5 Suffice it to
say that Richard Posner tells us that Aristotle appears to have
defined the term "wrong" to encompass only the commission
of an intentional tort, 6 whereas Richard Wright tells us that
Aristotle understood the term "wrong" to include intentional
torts, recklessness, negligence, and strict tort liability.3 7 The
critical passage from Aristotle states:
[I]t makes no difference [from a corrective justice perspective] whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad
man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that
has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive
character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one
is in the wrong and the other is being wronged,
a and if one
inflicted injury and the other has received it.
I am content to regard corrective justice as aform ofjustice that
accommodates any bilateral dispute in which one party seeks a
remedy for another party's violation of a legally recognized
right.3 9 I think that interpretation is consistent with Aristotle's
description of corrective justice, as opposed to distributive justice. I agree with Richard Posner that, if Aristotle did define the
term "wrong" to encompass only the commission of intentional torts, he defined the term narrowly because the Greek
law of his time confined the concept of tortious conduct to intentionally tortious conduct.40
The third issue that I want to consider is whether corrective
and distributive justice are categorically different, so that tort
reformers must either modify tort law in accord with the form
of corrective justice or replace it with an accident compensation
35. For the transliterated Greek, see Posner, supra note 32, at 189 n.8. For two different translations of the ancient Greek to modem English, see id. at 189; see also
Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, supra note 7, at 419.
36. See Posner,supranote 32, at 190-91.Judge Posner also tells us that, because the
Greek word for "wrong" (adikos) means "unlawful" as well as unjust, "it is unclear to
what extent Aristotle thought he was doing more than describing legal concepts that
happened to be prevalent in his society." Id. at 206 n. 59.
37. See Wright, supra note 33, at 697-99.
38. IV ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131b26-1132a6 (W. David Ross &James
0. Urmson trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
1984).
39. In other words, I am content to regard Aristotle's use of the word "wrongful" as
meaning "unlawful." See Posner, supra note 32, at 206 n.59.
40. See id. at 201-02.
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plan in the form of distributive justice. I believe that Professor
Weinrib is correct in concluding that corrective and distributive
justice are categorically distinct concepts. 4 1 Therefore, I think
that tort reformers should take seriously both of his admonitions. First of all, when we propose modifications in tort law,
we should remember that tort law governs bilateral transactions and that its purpose is to "correct injustice."' 42 This
means that the remedy should rectify the wrong completely-not
just partially. For example, in considering whether to put caps
on damages, we should ask ourselves whether the truncated
remedy will operate effectively to "correct injustice," or
whether it will only partially restore the plaintiff to the position
that the plaintiff would have been in had the legal wrong not
been committed.
Second, when we propose to abolish tort law and replace it
with an accident compensation plan, there are two types of
questions that we should ask ourselves. Initially, we should
contemplate whether we want to abolish all tort law actions or
only some of them. For example, we might want to distinguish
between negligence actions and intentional tort actions. Intentional torts often can be characterized as causing losses that are
both morally and legally wrongful.4" This is the type of injustice that the form of corrective justice is ideally suited to rectify.
Therefore, we might not want to abolish intentional tort actions and replace them with an accident compensation plan. Instead, we might want to devise an accident compensation plan
that replaces only negligence actions, but not intentional tort
actions.4 4
Once we have determined which types of tort actions we
want to abolish, we should then determine whether the accident compensation plan should be informed by principles of
corrective or distributive justice.4 5 It would be theoretically
possible to design an accident compensation plan based on
principles of corrective justice. Premiums would be paid in by
those people who create risks of harm; money would be paid
41. See Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice,supra note 7,at 407-09, 413-18.
42. See id. at 417-18.
43. See generally Posner, supra note 7, at 187.
44. See generallyJean C. Love, Actionsfor Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the
Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers Compensation), 73 CAL.
L. REv. 857 (1985).
45. See Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, supra note 7, at 418.
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out to those people whose harms are caused by the tortious
conduct of another human being; and then, at the end of the
year, there would be an adjustment in the premiums paid to
reflect the actual losses caused by those people who tortiously
inflicted harm. Most jurisdictions, however, do not adopt accident compensation plans premised on principles of corrective
justice. Instead, most accident compensation plans reflect principles of distributive justice.4" Money is paid in by people who
are subject to taxation; money is paid out to people who have
sustained harm to the person. The critical question is whether
the claimants may recover compensation only for tortiously
caused harms or whether compensation may be claimed regardless of the cause of the loss.
The lesson that formalism can teach us is that we should
identify the claimants in accord with principles of distributive
justice, not corrective justice. Otherwise, there will always be
pressure on the plan to expand. For example, if a workers'
compensation plan that is allegedly based on distributive justice principles confines its coverage to tortiously caused harms,
there will be pressure on it to expand its coverage to encompass nontortiously and naturally caused harms, such as being
hurt on the job by an inevitable accident or a bolt of lightning.
If an accident compensation plan is designed to cover only injuries sustained on the job, there will be demands for it to expand its coverage to accidents in the home. Formalism thus
helps us to understand the structure of New Zealand's accident
compensation plan as originally adopted.4 7 Under the original
New Zealand plan, money is paid in by people who are subject
to levies or taxation, and money is paid out to anyone who has
sustained harm anywhere as a result of an accident.
In conclusion, as a reasonable law professor who teaches
torts, I find that formalism helps me to think more clearly about
the basic structure of tort law. In particular, it helps me to formulate appropriate remedies for the commission of tortious
wrongs, and I find it to be invaluable in evaluating the development of accident compensation schemes. I do not believe, however, that it resolves all of the issues raised by torts scholars in
the 1990s. In particular, I do not think that it resolves the ques46. See generally ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1989).
47. See generally GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979).
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tion of whether tort liability should be based on fault. This determination depends on premises outside the necessary
framework of formalism.
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